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RECENT BOOKS
THE CHALLENGE OF LAW REFORM. By Arthur T. Vanderbilt. Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1955. Pp. vi, 194. $3.50.
Lawyers who heard Chief Justice Vanderbilt deliver the William W.
Cook Foundation lectures in Ann Arbor in 1948, or who read the book
Men and Measures in the Law published the following year, know in
general the New Jersey jurist's views on judicial reform which are the
subject of the University of Virginia lectures published in his latest volume.
They cover the fields of selection of judges, procedural reform, elimination of delay, court organization and administration, and the simplification and modernization of the substantive law. As to each he offers a
happy combination of historical background, current developments, constructive criticism, and his own original suggestions.
Typical of the latter is the interesting suggestion that we cannot hope
to make much progress in improving the caliber of the judiciary until we
have a simple and understandable declaration of the qualifications and
attributes of a good appellate judge, a good trial judge, and a good local
magistrate, so that those who are responsible for the selection of judges
may have adequate standards by which to measure candidates for judicial
office. Such a declaration, he suggests, would be no more difficult to
formulate than the canons of judicial ethics; the only difference would
be that the proposed declaration would deal with traits and experience
necessary to equip a lawyer to go on the bench rather than with the rules
governing his conduct once he is there. Although not designed as such
a declaration, a passage of rare eloquence from the first page of the second
chapter is of extreme interest in that connection:
"We need judges learned in the law, not merely the law in books
but, something far more difficult to acquire, the law as applied in
action in the courtroom; judges deeply versed in the mysteries of human
nature and adept in the discovery of the truth in the discordant testimony of fallible human beings; judges beholden to no man, independent and honest and-equally important-believed by all men
to be independent and honest; judges, above all, fired with consuming zeal to mete out justice according to law to every man, woman
and child that may come before them and to preserve individual fn~edom against any aggression of government; judges with the humility
born of wisdom, patient and untiring in the search for truth and
keenly conscious of the evils arising in a workaday world from any
unnecessary delay."
In his treatment of judicial selection Chief Justice Vanderbilt commends
the Missouri plan (appointment by the governor from a list of names submitted by a nominating commission, appointees thereafter going before the
voters in a non-competitive election for continuation in office), but he also
emphasizes another principle of judicial selection about which not very
much has been said-the bi-partisan judiciary. This, he says, has been en-
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joyed for many years in Delaware by constitutional provision and in New
Jersey by tradition. It insures that at least half of the judges will not be appointed for political considerations, but because they are competent
lawyers with judicial temperament. Furthermore, judges are not exposed to the danger of not being reappointed simply because the governor
at the moment is of the opposite political faith. He adds that decisions
of a bi-partisan court have more weight in cases of political importance.
These considerations suggest that in appointive states steps should be
taken to achieve a bi-partisan judiciary, which, says Chief Justice Vanderbilt, really is the only way in this country to achieve a non-partisan
judiciary.

In elective jurisdictions we think this is not quite so clear. The only
way to have a bi-partisan judiciary in a state like New York or Illinois
is for the party leaders to agree in advance on how many from each party
are to be elected in each judicial election, and draw up the slate of nominations accordingly. But that is the substance of the "deals" that have
been widely denounced in New York and Chicago on the ground that
they effectually deprive the voters of all the power of choice and amount
to outright appointment by party leaders. Nobody can deny, however,
that the Missouri plan, good as its record is, would have been strengthened
if the Missouri governors had established a tradition of bi-partisan
appointments.
Perhaps the greatest contrast between the Michigan and Virginia
lectures is to be found in their respective chapters on court administration. In 1948 the New Jersey constitution had just been revised, but the
new, system had not yet gone into operation at the time of the lectures.
Chief Justice Vanderbilt described the efforts of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania to compel a trial judge to decide his cases, and he spoke
briefly and approvingly of the administrative offices in Connecticut and
in the federal system. During the intervening years, he established in
his own New Jersey judicial system an administrative office probably
more effective and efficient than any other, and wrought miracles in
cleaning up decades of delay and congestion through introduction of
efficient procedures and business management. He rightly devotes a halfdozen pages of the 1955 volume to describing this office and its work. It is
the agency through which the power to assign judges from one point to
another as needed is exercised, and it compiles the statistics on which the
need for such assignments is predicated. It manages the fiscal and business affairs of the courts, including a $3,000,000 budget. Its director
supervises publications of opinions, serves as public relations officer for
the courts, supplies information and investigates complaints.
C

Chief Justice Vanderbilt then makes sharp criticism of certain features of the federal administrative system, and of practically every feature
of the administrative set-up established last year in New York. The

1956]

RECENT BooKS

889

federal system, he says, lacks an executive head. It is like a corporation
with a board of directors but no president. Not enough use is being
made of the power of assignment of judges, even within circuits, and
practically none at all from one circuit to another, largely because such
assignments have been kept on a voluntary basis. He commends the statistical work of the federal office, but points out one gaping hole in ita total lack of information as to how the individual judges spend their
time and how much work they do. Finally, he criticizes the federal administrative system for its reluctance to make mandatory such wellrecognized improvements as pre-trial procedure, even now in use in less
than half of the federal courts.
But it is the New York "court administration" plan recently enacted
at the behest of the Temporary Commission on the Courts which the
Chief Justice really finds lacking in merit. The quotation marks around
the words "court administration" are his, for although those words are
used over and over again in the statute, he denies that there is anything
in it to justify them. In eleven scorching pages he shows how the judicial conference is manned with persons who will always and inevitably
be defenders of the status quo, and that although the language of administration is used, the group has no real administrative powers at all, but
can only "study and make recommendations" with respect to the several
areas where administrative action is so urgently needed. "The legislature
has merely purloined a term that has a definite, known meaning in the
nineteen states that have administrative establishments and misappropriated
it for an office that is utterly without administrative powers."
Again drawing on experience in New Jersey since 1948, Chief Justice
Vanderbilt denounces the practice of scheduling oral argument before
the judges have read the briefs, and he has nothing but scorn for the
intra-court procedures that give rise to the one-man opinion-"a fraud on
the litigants and the public." "No opinion," he says, "should become
the opinion of the court without a full discussion by the entire court of
all the issues developed at the argument before the case is assigned for
the writing of the opinion; and after the opinion has been written it
should likewise be studied by every member of the court and subjected
to frank criticism in conference as to both substance and language."
Reasonable and minimal standards, surely, and yet they are not met in
many courts of last resort.
In his last lecture the Chief Justice reviews, much as he did in 1948,
the tremendous growth of judicial, legislative and administrative law and
the efforts of the American Law Institute and others to find a way through
the maze. He then develops a theme recently voiced by Pound, Hamo
and others that the best hope is through law centers built around law
schools, where judges, legislators, teachers and laymen may work together
for the improvement of the law. Any law school, he says, which lifts
its sights beyond the traditional role of training law students to face
these problems is properly called a law center.
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In his foreword to Men and Measures, Chief Justice Vanderbilt acknowledged that there was a great deal of criticism in it, but justified
it by saying frankly that the times were critical times. He added that
young people prefer the "unembellished truth." It is an interesting
sidelight on the judicial office that seven years have not softened the
vigorous spirit of this man who all his life has fought his battles with
all he had. On the contrary, the new volume is still more forthright
and outspoken, as we have seen, and we cannot refrain from quoting
one more somewhat dramatic example. In 1948 the new justice, who
had just donned judicial robes after a long and active career at the bar,
had this to say about the judges who oppose judicial reform:
"Now and then we find an unusual judge or lawyer who is genuinely concerned with procedural reform, but generally we must expect active opposition from the bench and, at best, inertia from the
bar."

The following blistering words are from the 1955 volume:
"I am convinced that the criminals, the gangsters, the corrupt
local officials, the communistic subversives, and the apathetic citizens
are no more dangerous to their communities and to the country at
large than the judges, many of them amiable gentlemen, who oppose
either openly or covertly every change in procedural law and administration _that would serve to eliminate technicalities, surprise and
undue delay in the law simply because they would be called upon
to learn new rules of procedure or new and more effective methods
of work. Their number is legion."

Glenn R. Winters,
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American Judicature Society,

